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ONE MAN’S TRASH:
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM
AND PRIVACY IMPLICATED IN SAN FRANCISCO’S
MANDATORY RECYCLING ORDINANCE AND
FUTURE SIMILAR LEGISLATION
J. Tyler Smith†
INTRODUCTION
According to the Environmental Protection Agency, in 2017,
Americans sent 139.6 million tons of garbage to landfills, of which
about twenty-two percent was food.1 To combat the United States’
landfill waste problem, municipalities across the country are promoting initiatives to encourage their residents to consider environmentally friendly alternatives. San Francisco went one step further:
in 2009, the city mandated recycling for all residents and introduced
steep fines for those who threw away recyclable materials.2 The city
also reduces the amount of recycling it needs by mandating composting throughout the city in addition to recycling and landfill
bins.3 It enforces these mandates by having sanitation workers
conduct audits of individual trash containers which involve those
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1
National Overview: Facts and Figures on Materials, Wastes, and Recycling,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/facts-and-figures-about-materials-waste-and-recyclin
g/national-overview-facts-and-figures-materials (last visited Aug. 10, 2020).
2
S.F., CAL., ENVIRONMENT CODE, ch. 19 (2020).
3
Id.
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workers physically examining what residents choose to throw away
versus what they choose to divert.4
On a larger scale, the entire state of Connecticut has mandatory recycling.5 Public Act No. 10-87 requires “[e]ach person who
generates solid waste from a residential property” to “separate from
other solid waste items designated for recycling.”6 Such legislation
is becoming increasingly common: twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have adopted some type of mandatory recycling as
of May 1, 2017.7 While the materials required under each state
differ and the enforcement mechanisms are not uniform, it is clear
that mandatory recycling is becoming more commonplace.
Although many jurisdictions across the United States are not
as extreme in their positions on recycling, San Francisco’s policies
implicate important constitutional questions. Namely, can the federal government mandate that Americans recycle? If so, can it
search a person’s garbage bin to certify compliance with the ordinance? Perhaps most importantly, should the government be
allowed to audit a person’s trash? Where does the Fourth
Amendment come into effect with warrantless searches of refuse?
This Article analyzes both the federalism and privacy concerns inherent in legislation similar to Ordinance 100-09. First, it
discusses principles of power-sharing in recycling mandates to
determine whether the federal government or the states should be
the body creating such laws. Second, it discusses the privacy implications ingrained in an audit system that both permits the government to search one’s trash without a warrant and to provide penalties
4

Erick Trickey, San Francisco’s Quest to Make Landfills Obsolete, POLITICO
(Nov. 21, 2019, 5:01 A.M.), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/11/
21/san-francisco-recycling-sustainability-trash-landfills-070075.
5
H.B. 5120, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2010).
6
Id.
7
NORTHEAST RECYCLING COUNCIL, DISPOSAL BANS & MANDATORY RECYCLING
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2017), https://nerc.org/documents/disposal_bans_man
datory_recycling_united_states.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/201911210229
13/https://nerc.org/documents/disposal_bans_mandatory_recycling_united_states.
pdf].
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for noncompliance. This portion of the analysis splits the privacy
rules into two categories of cases based on the location of the garbage receptacle: whether it is in the curtilage of one’s house or
whether it is outside of the curtilage of one’s house. Finally, this
Article provides recommendations for government bodies attempting to create mandates similar to Ordinance 100-09.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution establishes Congress’
enumerated powers.8 Two important clauses provide Congress with
seemingly broad authority. The first is the power to regulate interstate commerce “among the several States.”9 The second is the
power to “lay and collect taxes” to provide for the “general welfare
of the United States.”10 Any power not enumerated in Article I,
Section 8 is reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.11
The Tenth Amendment provides that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”12 A key carveout of the Tenth
Amendment is that certain powers are expressly prohibited to the
States under Article I, Section 10: including, for example, the power
to make treaties,13 coin money,14 and declare war.15 The power of
states is also limited under the doctrine of selective incorporation,
with most of the Constitution’s Amendments being interpreted as
restrictions on state power.16
8

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
11
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
12
Id.
13
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
14
Id.
15
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
16
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (providing that the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of assistance of counsel for criminal defendants applies
to the states); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (incorporating the Fifth
Amendment’s protection from self-incrimination to the states); Timbs v. Indiana,
9
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Several constitutional Amendments limit the police powers
of the states, perhaps most notably the Fourth Amendment.17 The
Fourth Amendment generally is regarded as the Amendment that
gives Americans a so-called right to privacy against certain governmental actions in that it protects people from “unreasonable searches
and seizures” of their “persons, houses, papers, and effects” without
a warrant.18 This privacy protection, though not explicit in the
Amendment, comes from Katz v. United States, where the Court
analyzed what is covered by the Amendment19 based on where the
defendant has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”20
Because obtaining a warrant in every circumstance is
impractical, special circumstances exist that permit the police to
forego the warrant requirement.21 San Francisco’s trash audit program could fall into two categories of exceptions: the consent
exception22 or the plain view exception.23 Additionally, many
courts, including the Supreme Court, are reluctant to recognize a
139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (establishing that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
punishments that are “cruel and unusual” is a restriction on state actions as well as
federal punishments).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment to the states).
18
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
20
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing the police to “stop and
frisk” a person that they have “reasonable suspicion” is armed and dangerous);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (allowing a warrantless search after a
person is lawfully arrested in order to protect police).
22
See generally Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (holding that evidence
obtained in a warrantless entry is admissible based on the consent of a party who
possesses “common authority” over the premises).
23
See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (holding that an automobile registration card that was “plainly visible” was not obtained through an
illegal search); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (permitting the admission of
evidence that was obtained when a police shined a flashlight into the defendant’s
car); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (holding moving papers
that obstructed the defendant’s vehicle identification number did not constitute an
unreasonable search because of governmental efforts to ensure that the vehicle
identification number is in plain view).
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broad, unconditional “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a
person’s garbage.24
II. FEDERALISM, PRIVACY, AND POLICE SURVEILLANCE
Questions of federalism, privacy, and police surveillance are
raised by San Francisco’s recycling mandate. As jurisdictions across
the United States begin to formulate similar environmental policies,
two central questions should be at the heart of legislative debates.
First, what level of government is most appropriate to address such
pressing environmental concerns? Second, are mandatory recycling
laws appropriate under the Fourth Amendment and under common
notions of privacy?
A. Principles of Federalism in Recycling Mandates
As previously discussed, the federal government’s lawmaking powers are limited to those enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution,25 with all other powers “not delegated to the
United States . . . nor prohibited by it to the States . . . reserved to the
States” under the Tenth Amendment.26 San Francisco’s mandatory
recycling initiative raises important federalism questions: is the city
the best body to legislate over such activity? Would a national
program with similar requirements be more appropriate to provide
uniformity across the country? Does the federal government have
such broad powers?

24

See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that an expectation of privacy does not exist in garbage placed for collection outside the
curtilage of one’s home); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978)
(holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash
when the trash had already been removed from the defendant’s residence);
Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that a reasonable
expectation of trash can exist when the defendant takes steps that are calculated to
avoid snooping).
25
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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To answer these questions, it is crucial to return to the
tension between the Tenth Amendment and the enumerated powers
of Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.27 The
authority of the federal government to hypothetically mandate
recycling in the United States could come from one of two sources:
the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause.28 The
first part of this section analyzes such a program under the Commerce Clause, and the second part conducts an analysis under the
Taxing and Spending Clause.
B. Commerce Clause
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the United States has
shifted considerably since the Constitution was drafted.29 While
some eras of the Supreme Court took an expansive view of the
Commerce Clause, others ruled sharply that Congress was attempting to regulate non-commercial activities. Before understanding the
contemporary scope of the Commerce Clause, a discussion of the
Court’s history with the Clause is necessary.

27

See U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that all powers not given to the federal
government or “prohibited by it to the States” are “reserved tor the States”); id. art.
I, § 8 (listing powers given to the federal government); see also id. art. I, § 10
(listing powers denied to the states).
28
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 3.
29
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935)
(establishing the “direct” versus “indirect” test for the validity of Commerce
Clause legislation); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)
(abandoning the “direct” versus “indirect” test and establishing the “close and
substantial relation” test). Compare Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S.
321, 347 (1903) (holding that the Commerce Clause “acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution”), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (permitting congressional action to prevent one farmer
from growing wheat for personal consumption), with Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 573–75 (2012) (prohibiting use of the Commerce Clause
to force a person to engage in commerce), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 558–59 (1995) (establishing the contemporary three-category framework that
Congress may legislate under the Commerce Clause).
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The Clause was first examined in detail in Gibbons v.
Ogden, in which the Court considered whether Congress could regulate navigation over New York’s waters.30 Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority, wrote that commerce included navigation, “but it is
something more: it is intercourse.”31 Thus, Congress could regulate
nearly anything under the Commerce Clause as long as it relates to
“commercial intercourse” and is “prescribing rules for carrying on
that intercourse.”32 An analysis under Gibbons v. Ogden would
indicate that the federal government could in fact mandate recycling:
requiring consumers to dispose of products in a specific way is
simply an attached condition on the purchase of goods. It is
“prescribing a rule for carrying on” the sale of products.33
The Court in the Lottery Case would likely also agree with a
national recycling mandate. Here, the Court considered a congressional ban on lottery tickets across state lines.34 Justice Harlan
reasoned that Congress can regulate interstate commerce by any
means necessary, including an outright ban on items that are considered harmful to the general welfare.35 The Lottery Case Court
might consider a mandatory recycling law to actually be a general
prohibition of certain goods (e.g. organic waste and plastics) in
landfills. Thus, under this analysis, the federal government would be
well within its authority to mandate recycling under the Commerce
Clause.
The Court later took a more restrictive, conservative
approach to its understanding of the Commerce Clause. In A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, for example, Justice
Hughes distinguished between “direct” and “indirect” effects on
interstate commerce and ruled that activities indirectly affecting
interstate commerce can only be regulated by the states under the

30

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1824).
Id. at 189.
32
Id. at 189–90.
33
Id. at 190.
34
Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 322–23.
35
See id. at 346–47.
31
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Tenth Amendment.36 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., decided just one
year later, Justice Sutherland defined commerce to mean “intercourse for the purposes of trade,” which included the sale and
transportation of commodities but not the manufacture or production
of them.37 While Justice Hughes might argue that a mandatory
recycling program is too indirectly related to interstate commerce to
be within Congress’ power, Justice Sutherland would likely contend
that the disposal of a commodity would not fall under the definition
of commerce because recycled goods ultimately become important
in manufacturing. In either case, a mandatory recycling law would
be patently unconstitutional.
After the more conservative approaches in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. and Carter, the Court shifted back to an extremely
expansive view of the Commerce Clause.38 A particularly liberal
view of the Clause is found in Wickard v. Filburn, in which the
Court ruled that Congress has the authority to regulate a single
person’s production of wheat intended for personal consumption on
the grounds that it takes away from the open market.39 Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States—as another example of this more
liberal approach—allowed Congress to prohibit discrimination at a
hotel under the Clause because it placed an artificial restriction on
the market.40 While neither of these cases are particularly analogous
36

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 456 (1935).
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298 (1936).
38
Compare A.L.A. Schechter, 295 U.S. 495 (restricting congressional regulation
under the Commerce Clause to “direct” effects on interstate commerce), and
Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (holding that the Commerce Clause cannot be used to
regulate the manufacture or production of commodities), with Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (permitting Congress to regulate a single person’s
agricultural habits on the basis that it would have a “substantial effect” on the
interstate economy), and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
258 (1964) (“[The Commerce Clause] extends to those activities intrastate which
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end
. . . .”).
39
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29.
40
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258.
37
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to the hypothetical at hand, both illustrate a willingness of the Court
to expand the definition of commerce greatly in order to give
Congress sweeping legislative power.
The current jurisprudence surrounding the Commerce
Clause stems from United States v. Lopez. In this case, the Court
ruled that Congress can only regulate three categories of activities
under the Commerce Clause: (1) the “channels of interstate commerce”; (2) the “instrumentalities of,” or persons or things in,
interstate commerce; and (3) activities that have “a substantial
relation to interstate.”41 The use of these categories was repeated in
United States v. Morrison, where the Court emphasized a key
constraint: simply showing an economic connection between an
activity and interstate commerce is not sufficient under the Lopez
precedent.42
An important additional restriction was created in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: Congress cannot
use the Commerce Clause to force individuals to engage in commerce.43 Justice Robert’s opinion in this case creates a substantial
obstacle for the federal government in attempting to mandate
recycling: there probably could not be any costs associated with the
program. If, for example, Congress passed a law requiring each
person to take out his or her recycling weekly, Congress likely could
not force the person to pay for pickup services related to that
recycling because to do so would force the person to engage in
commerce.
Sebelius would also cause problems because current practice
shows that most recycling goes overseas. Whereas each state has its
41

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“[T]hus far in our
Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”); see also Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so.”).
43
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 540 (2012).
42

120

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 28

own landfill system for waste,44 much of the United States’ recycling tends to be exported. For example, the United States sends over
one million metric tons of plastic each year abroad.45 Therefore, if
Congress mandated recycling, it would be forcing Americans to
engage in interstate commerce when they would ordinarily only be
interacting with intrastate landfill systems.
A key implication of using the Commerce Clause to mandate
recycling is that the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would
apply. In Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., Justice Marshall
ruled that the Commerce Clause is not simply an enumerated power
of the federal government; rather, it is a limitation placed on the
states.46 A state law will be preempted,47 even if the federal government has not yet exercised its Commerce Clause power, if it is
“repugnant” to the federal government’s ability to regulate interstate
commerce.48 Therefore, any ruling that Congress can use the
Commerce Clause to mandate recycling would immediately take
that power away from the states under this doctrine.
It is likely under the precedent of Lopez and Morrison that a
federal recycling mandate would be unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause. Recycling is patently not a channel of interstate
commerce, and it is probably not an instrumentality of interstate
commerce. While an argument could be made that recycling is a key
component of manufacturing and thus an activity that has “a
substantial relation to” interstate commerce, Morrison precedent
would likely prevail and show that recycling is simply not an
economic activity—it is rather an act of disposal, wholly unrelated
44

Project and Landfill Data by State, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lmop/projectand-landfill-data-state (last visited Aug. 15, 2020).
45
Renee Cho, Recycling in the U.S. Is Broken. How Do We Fix It?, STATE OF THE
PLANET (Mar. 13, 2020), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2020/03/13/fix-recyclingamerica.
46
Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 250 (1829).
47
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (holding that state laws
are preempted when they conflict with federal law and when they regulate a field
over which Congress has “exclusive governance”).
48
Black Bird, 27 U.S. at 251.
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to commerce. If, however, a mandate were to survive the Lopez test,
it would likely fail under Sebelius because current infrastructure
limitations would require consumers to engage in commerce.
C. Taxing and Spending Clause
As an alternative to using the Commerce Clause, Congress
could attempt to enact legislation to make recycling mandatory
using its taxing and spending clause powers.49 While these two
powers are used together, they have separate rules about their usage.
An analysis of the power to tax turns on the tension between Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,50 while an analysis of the power to spend relies on
the test established in South Dakota v. Dole.51 Each of these
analyses show that the power to tax and spend can be used to enact
mandatory recycling initiatives, but the use of each power comes
with unique restrictions and problems.
In the Child Labor Tax Case, Justice Taft held that Congress
may exercise a “prohibitory and regulatory effect” when the matter
is typically reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.52
However, this ruling noted that a tax that simply imposed an “incidental restraint” is valid.53 Under Bailey, then, a recycling mandate
would only be constitutional if it imposed an “incidental restraint,”
such as financially incentivizing recycling while penalizing sending
49

See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
(holding that Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause to create the individual
mandate of the Affordable Care Act but it can use the Taxing and Spending
Clause).
50
Compare Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (holding that the individual mandate of the
Affordable Care Act is valid under the Taxing Clause on the grounds that it
functions as a tax on deciding not to enroll in health insurance), with Child Labor
Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (holding that child
labor cannot be taxed under the Taxing Clause because Congress is attempting to
use the Clause with a “prohibitory and regulatory” effect).
51
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).
52
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 37.
53
Id. at 38.
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recyclables to landfills. It could not prohibit or regulate sending
recyclable goods to landfills, and thus the mandate would lose its
intended effect.
Some cases since Bailey, however, demonstrate a tendency
of courts to permit the use of the tax power to accomplish certain
goals.54 For example, in Helvering v. Davis, Justice Cardozo upheld
the old age benefits of the Social Security Act because the problem
was national in scope and needed a national response to deal with
financial realities associated with old age.55 Additionally, in United
States v. Kahriger, Justice Reed wrote that a tax is not invalid
simply because it deters activity.56 This ruling noted that courts
cannot “limit the exercise of the taxing power” without evidence
that provisions of a tax bill are unrelated to tax needs.57 Further, the
Court has tended to be highly deferential to the determinations of
Congress.58
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
the Court shifted substantially when Justice Roberts noted that the
individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act could be viewed as
simply a tax on those who do not buy insurance.59 He wrote that
54

See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937) (allowing Congress to
use the Taxing Clause to solve an issue that is “national in area and dimensions”
that “the laws of the states cannot deal with . . . effectively.”); United States v.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); see also Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506,
513 (1937) (permitting use of the Taxing Clause to require a $200 license tax on
firearm dealers).
55
Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644.
56
Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28; see also Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513 (“But a tax is not
any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect.”).
57
Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31.
58
See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513–14 (“Inquiry into the hidden motives which may
move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond
the competency of courts.”); Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640 (“The discretion belongs
to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not
an exercise of judgment.”); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 594 (1937)
(“Congress must have the benefit of a fair margin of discretion.”); Kahriger, 345
U.S. at 31 (“Unless there are provisions extraneous to any tax need, courts are
without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing power.”).
59
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 563 (2012).
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when there are two possible meanings to a congressional law,
Courts should assume the meaning that does not violate the Constitution.60 Under this analysis, imposing a fine on those that do not
recycle could be seen as a tax on the act of sending something
recyclable to a landfill. Thus, the mandate to recycle could potentially be upheld under the taxing power of Congress.
However, Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Kahriger notes a
serious problem with using the tax power: Congress could potentially then use the taxing power to regulate behaviors and activities
beyond its enumerated powers.61 Even if the taxing power could be
used to mandate that every American recycle, it would create
troubling precedent that could allow Congress to mandate nearly
any type of behavior. Although a mandatory recycling law might be
constitutional under Sebelius, it would be more appropriate to rely
on precedent from Bailey to prevent an overreach of congressional
power.
Using the spending power is not susceptible to the same
slippery-slope problems implicated by the taxing power: use of the
spending power has a much clearer test for what is acceptable
behavior. This test, set out in South Dakota v. Dole, states that the
receipt of federal funds can be conditional if (1) the exercise of the
spending power is “in pursuit of ‘the general welfare’”; (2) the conditions are laid out “unambiguously”; (3) the conditions are related
“to the federal interest in” a specific national project or program;
and (4) the conditions are themselves constitutional.62 In Dole,
Justice Rehnquist held that federal highway funds could be withheld
from states that did not raise the minimum drinking age to 21.63
Consider a congressional act mandating that all states
impose compulsory recycling laws with fines for those who do not
compost wasted food, and any state who chooses not to enact such a
law loses food-related federal grants such as WIC. Under this test,
60

Id. at 562.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
62
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).
63
Id. at 209.
61
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such an act would surely be constitutional. It is in pursuit of the
general welfare because the national landfill crisis affects each
state;64 it is unambiguous because the conditions clearly state the
consequences of noncompliance; and withholding food-related federal grants surely relates to the effort to reduce food waste and does
not violate any other parts of the Constitution.
Some critics of such a law might argue that it is far too much
of a temptation to enact the food composting law or that losing WIC
funding would be an unrealistic option for the states under precedent
from National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.65
After all, nearly eight million people participated in the program in
2018.66 However, the temptation argument would fail under Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, wherein the Court held that temptation does
not equate coercion.67 While the Sebelius argument would be persuasive, it too would ultimately fail on because of a key distinction
between the cases: in Sebelius, Congress attempted to ensure
compliance with a federal regulatory program,68 while in the hypothetical at hand, Congress is simply asking the states to enact their
own regulatory programs.
Ultimately, the use of the Taxing and Spending Clause to
mandate recycling would be a constitutional use of congressional
power, but it would be highly controversial and antithetical to the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the taxing power could
potentially be used to fine residents who send recyclables to landfills, allowing such an exercise of this power would be, as Justice
64

Ann M. Simmons, The World’s Trash Crisis, and Why Many Americans Are
Oblivious, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016, 3:00 A.M.), https://www.latimes.com/
world/global-development/la-fg-global-trash-20160422-20160421-snap-html
story.html.
65
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 581 (holding that losing Medicaid funding for not implementing the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act was not a realistic
choice for state governments).
66
WIC Participant and Program Characteristics 2018 – Charts, USDA (last
visited Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/participant-and-programcharacteristics-2018-charts.
67
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937).
68
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 581.
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Frankfurter wrote, the Court “shut[ting] its eyes to what is obviously, because designedly, an attempt to control conduct which the
Constitution left to the responsibility of the States.”69 Additionally,
while the spending power could be used to condition federal funds,
doing so would really just be forcing the states to create legislation.
Thus, while the federal government cannot use the Commerce
Clause to enact a recycling mandate, it could use the taxing and
spending powers; however, the more appropriate avenue for
mandatory recycling would be the use of state governments under
the Tenth Amendment.70
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF A STATE GOVERNMENT
ENFORCING A MANDATORY RECYCLING LAW BY AUDITING
GARBAGE: TWO POSSIBLE OUTCOMES BASED ON CURTILAGE
In addition to the federalism questions raised by San Francisco’s
mandatory recycling ordinance, basic privacy rights are implicated
by permitting sanitation workers to audit a person’s trash and check
compliance with the law. There are several legal questions raised by
such a practice; namely, can the government search a person’s
garbage and use what it finds to issue fines? What are the privacy
rights a person has in his or her own refuse? When does someone’s
property right in garbage end?
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches and
seizures.71 Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment.72 When information is obtained by officers by
“physically intruding” on the defendant’s property, a search has
occurred.73 Any evidence obtained without a warrant cannot be used
against a person in a court of law under the exclusionary rule
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United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971).
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Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013).
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established in Weeks v. United States.74 Caselaw regarding searches
of trash receptacles create two potential rules for whether evidence
obtained without a warrant will be excluded: when the trash is
located outside of one’s curtilage, no warrant is necessary; when the
trash is located within one’s curtilage, a warrant should be
necessary.
A. Garbage Searches Outside the Curtilage of One’s Home
In the landmark case Katz v. United States, the Supreme
Court interpreted a so-called right to privacy in the Fourth Amendment against certain types of “governmental invasion.”75 In that
case, the Court established that, in order for Fourth Amendment
protections to apply, the defendant must have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” over the property in question.76 Justice Harlan’s
concurrence created a test to aid with Fourth Amendment search
analysis and establish an expectation of privacy under the majority’s
view: first, the complainant must have “an actual expectation of
privacy” (the subjective prong), and second, the expectation of
privacy “must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” (the objective prong).77
The Supreme Court has already heard one claim regarding
Fourth Amendment protections as they apply to trash in California
v. Greenwood.78 In that case, Justice White held that a person does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage and that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search of
garbage “left for collection outside the curtilage of a home.”79 Thus,
it is settled that San Francisco’s policy of auditing trash to ensure
compliance with its mandatory recycling law is constitutional as
74

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state courts).
75
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
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Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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long as the garbage was collected outside the curtilage of the home.
However, this case left open an important question: what if the
garbage was left for collection within the curtilage of the home and
the search took place there? This question requires a return to Justice
Harlan’s Katz test.
B. Supporting the Warrant Requirement for
Garbage Searches within One’s Curtilage
Crucial to analyzing San Francisco’s trash audit system
using Justice Harlan’s test in Katz is first defining what the relevant
property interests a person has in his or her trash. Property is
considered abandoned if the owner meets two elements: he or she
must (1) display an “intention to abandon” the property and (2)
commit “an act or omission by which such intention is carried into
effect.”80 Under this theory, trash would seemingly be abandoned
property: the owner is literally “throwing away” 81 the property and
acting on the intention to abandon it by placing it outside for
someone else to collect.
However, simply abandoning property is not sufficient to
relinquish all Fourth Amendment protections associated with it. In
Soldal v. Cook County, the Court noted that “property rights are not
the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.”82 This is consistent with the ruling in Katz, for example, wherein the defendant’s
speech in a phonebooth was protected by the Fourth Amendment
despite the defendant having no ownership of the booth.83 Thus, I
propose that courts should look beyond the mere abandonment
theory of property regarding the search of garbage and consider
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other relevant factors; namely, whether the garbage is within the
curtilage of the residence.
Fourth Amendment protections apply not only to a person’s
home, but also to the area “immediately surrounding and associated
with” the home, known as the curtilage, because the defendant has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of his or her
home.84 The curtilage is “the area outside the home . . . so close to
and intimately connected with the home and the activities that
normally go on there that it can . . . be considered part of the
home.”85
Determining the extent of curtilage for a given property
requires an examination of four factors: (1) the extent of enclosure
surrounding the home; (2) the nature and use of the area; (3) the
steps the resident took to protect the area from public observation;
and (4) the proximity of the area to the home.86 These factors are
weighed on a case-by-case basis, but it is certainly possible for a
garbage collection receptacle to be within the curtilage of the home.
For example, while many Americans place their trash at the curb for
collection, some jurisdictions allow trash pickup in a person’s back
yard or other areas in specific circumstances.87
In fact, the placement of garbage in the curtilage of a home
is a scenario that concerned Chief Judge Posner in United States v.
Redmon, wherein he suggested in his dissent that “searches, inclu84

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2001).
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See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
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visited Aug. 19, 2020) (allowing the pickup of garbage, but not recycling, in
Seattle backyards); I’m Disabled and Can’t Carry My Garbage to the Curb? What
Can I do?, TOWN OF WEAVERVILLE, N.C., https://www.weavervillenc.org/sp_
faq/im-disabled-and-cant-carry-my-garbage-can-to-the-curb-what-can-i-do (last
visited Aug. 19, 2020) (allowing carry out and carry back services under special
circumstances, including incapacitation due to age, disability, or infirmity); 70 or
Disabled Assistance, WASTELINE, https://wasteline.org/ garbage-information/70or-disabled-assistance (last visited Aug. 18, 2019) (permitting garbage pickup for
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ding searches of garbage, that take place within the curtilage of the
defendant’s property must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s
restriction on searches.”88 This dissent is consistent with the
curtilage distinction drawn in Greenwood.89 Jurisdictions across the
United States should adopt Judge Posner’s curtilage analysis
framework for Fourth Amendment garbage claims to best ensure
compliance with the spirit of Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence.
Consider a trash audit system where sanitation workers
physically search a resident’s trash on his or her curtilage and issue
fines if certain materials are not recycled. Under Judge Posner’s
rule, this would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment: a warrant
would be necessary to conduct such a search. Although it is possible
that a search of the garbage could take place after it has been
collected because a person would certainly not have an expectation
of privacy in trash in the possession of the municipality, this would
be more difficult as the trash of one resident is placed in the same
truck as the rest of the neighborhood’s garbage.
Under the subjective prong of the Katz test, a person must
have an “actual . . . expectation of privacy.”90 Justice Stewart wrote
for the majority in Katz that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . .
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”91 This rule works
under the subjective prong because of the understanding that curtilage searches are an invasion of privacy and a violation of the
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United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1129 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
89
Compare id. at 1129 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[S]earches, including searches of
garbage, that take place within the curtilage of the defendant’s property must
comply with the Fourth Amendment’s restriction on searches.”), with California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that garbage can be searched when it
is “left for collection outside the curtilage of a home”).
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Id. at 351.
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Fourth Amendment.92 The placement of the garbage matters greatly
under this scenario. For example, while a person placing garbage at
the curbside of his property would likely expect anyone to be able to
search through it, someone placing garbage for pickup in his or her
backyard would not expect someone to enter his or her property.
This rule is consistent with basic understandings of privacy.
Many people are deeply uncomfortable with the prospect of neighbors or police digging through their trash, a fact noted in Justice
Brennan’s dissent in Greenwood.93 In fact, this discomfort is so
widespread that many municipalities have enacted anti-scavenging
laws designed to prevent that exact scenario.94 It surely follows that
if a person’s trash was in fact in the curtilage of his or her own
backyard, that expectation of privacy would be present.
The second prong of the Katz analysis shows that society is
also likely prepared to recognize as reasonable an expectation of
privacy in a person’s trash. This is exemplified in decisions at state
courts throughout the country. For example, the Oregon Supreme
Court interpreted the Oregon State Constitution to include a right to
privacy in trash when a sanitation worker gave garbage to the police
for an unauthorized search.95 Additionally, Alaska refused to permit
police to search a person’s garbage without a warrant, as a general
rule, because it was “profoundly committed to the preservation of
personal privacy.”96 These holdings make clear that in several parts
92

See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (holding that a
defendant has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” over the curtilage of his own
home); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (establishing a test for
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of the country, Americans are uneasy about letting police use
evidence obtained in trash.97 Judge Posner’s curtilage carveout
acknowledges these fears without overturning Greenwood entirely.
In addition to meeting the Katz test, this rule would follow
other Fourth Amendment philosophy. Recent jurisprudence regarding the Fourth Amendment’s application is enlightened by two
principles: (1) “that the Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of
life’ against ‘arbitrary power,’” and (2) that the Framers wrote the
Amendment to “place obstacles in the way of a too permeating
police surveillance.”98 These principles set out in Carpenter, are
both satisfied by Judge Posner’s rule. The first component, securing
the privacies of life, are discussed in detail above.
Second, not allowing the search of trash on someone’s
curtilage would reinforce an obstacle to police surveillance. In order
to conduct a search on the curtilage of one’s home, a warrant is
ordinarily required.99 However, if Judge Posner’s rule were not in
effect, the warrant requirement could be bypassed by a Machiavellian officer seeking to obtain evidence by any means necessary.
Bypassing the warrant requirement is exactly what the Supreme
Court sought to prevent in Katz, stating “that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes.”100
Short of overturning Greenwood entirely, jurisdictions
across the United States should adopt Judge Posner’s curtilage rule
regarding trash searches to ensure that basic privacy rights of
Americans everywhere are protected. The right to privacy in one’s
trash on one’s curtilage is both subjectively and objectively reasonable. Moreover, recognizing this right is crucial to promoting robust
Fourth Amendment protections and preventing overbearing police
surveillance.
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IV. BALANCING MANDATORY RECYCLING AND PRIVACY
Crucial to San Francisco’s mandatory recycling ordinance is
the principle of federalism. Although the federal government might
be tempted to enact similar environmental mandates on a national
level, it should not do so to respect the power-sharing principles of
the Tenth Amendment. However, if such a program were created by
the federal government, several restrictions must be in place. First, it
cannot be done through use of the Commerce Clause under Lopez.
Second, although it could potentially be legal under the Taxing and
Spending Clause, the Spending portion of the Clause would provide
the best method of creating such legislation: restricting access to
related federal funds for waste-reduction initiatives. This would still
be a problematic approach but would ultimately leave crucial
decisions up to the states.
For states and municipalities that enact mandatory recycling
legislation, privacy considerations should be at the forefront of all
components of every such law. Although California v. Greenwood
permitted police officers to search a suspect’s garbage without a
warrant101 and thereby made Ordinance 100-09 and similar initiatives constitutional, this ruling should not be taken as absolute.
Instead, a distinction should be made between searches that take
place on one’s curtilage and searches that take place outside of one’s
curtilage. A search within one’s curtilage should adhere strictly to
the requirements and protections of the Fourth Amendment. In
adopting mandatory recycling programs, states and municipalities
should only permit the searches of trash receptacles that are located
off of one’s curtilage.
V. CONCLUSION
San Francisco’s mandatory recycling ordinance raises
important questions about federalism, privacy, and police surveillance. If the federal government were to attempt to create a national
101
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recycling mandate, the use of the taxing and spending clause would
be the best use of Congress’ power to do so. Use of the Commerce
Clause would ultimately fail under modern jurisprudence since
Lopez. Moreover, the federalism issues invoked in recycling legislation indicate that state and municipal governments should ultimately
be leading such charges in order to respect the limitations of
congressional power contained in the Tenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has not yet recognized a right to privacy
in trash, but this does not mean that such a right is without a
foundation. Many people are uncomfortable with the idea that a
nosy neighbor can simply search through their trash, and this
discomfort likely extends to searches by police as well. A search of
the curtilage of one’s home should still be protected under the
Fourth Amendment, and the privacy concerns of Americans across
the country should be at the front of lawmakers’ minds as mandatory recycling initiatives become more and more commonplace.

